Towards a Revitalization of Theory and Research on Victimization by Crime by Reiss, Albert J. Jr.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 72
Issue 2 Summer Article 12
Summer 1981
Towards a Revitalization of Theory and Research
on Victimization by Crime
Albert J. Jr. Reiss
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Albert J. Jr. Reiss, Towards a Revitalization of Theory and Research on Victimization by Crime, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 704
(1981)
0091-4169/81/7202-0704
THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 72, No. 2




The study of victimization and victimology has attracted a great deal of attention in
both the academic world and the criminalfjustice system. On March 10-11, 1980, a
Tictimology Research Workshop was held to develop a research agenda in the area of
basic victimology. The program was sponsored by the Ojfjce of Research Programs of
the National Institute ofJustice, United States Department ofJustice. ** This sympo-
sium includes edited versions of eight papers on victimization and victimology presented
at the workshop. Professor Rei'ssforeword was written especia4l for this symposium.
THE EDITORS
FOREWORD: TOWARDS A
REVITALIZATION OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH ON VICTIMIZATION
BY CRIME
ALBERT J. REISS, JR.***
INTRODUCTION
Not long ago Dr. Edward C. Stone, chief scientist of the Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory's Saturn project observed that at this stage in their
work scientific creativity was largely a team effort because planetary dis-
* The U.S. Department of Justice reserves the right to reproduce, publish, translate, or
otherwise use, and to authorize others to publish and use, all or any part of the copyrighted
material developed from the Victimology Workshop in this publication.
.** This project was supported by Grant #79-NI-AX0135 awarded to the MITRE Corpo-
ration by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, under Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view or opinions expressed in these papers
are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
*** Yale University.
VICTIMOLOGY SYMPOSIUM
covery requires the peculiar talents of astronomers, geologists, physicists,
meteorologists, and mathematicians. He went on to observe that:
The usual creative process, the quintessential scientific process, tends to be
a very individual process. . . . You have an idea yourself, you conceive of
ways to test your idea, you do your experiments and you report the results.
This is the classical method and it usually occurs over a long period of
time. But here lots of people see the data at the same time. They begin
immediately to suggest ideas and expose constraints on what the data
could mean. Peer review is going on at each step of the way, not at the end
of the process.I
Although the study of victimization is in many ways formally analogous
to space exploration, we have not as yet reached the organizational state
of Big Science where large research teams are bombarded continuously
by new information that they puzzle over together. The closest we may
come to that state is a periodic stock taking where a group of scientists
prepare reviews and then present them to their fellow scientists with
whom they then ransack both theory and data to suggest new explana-
tions and to plot one or more courses for research in the near term. This
symposium arose from such a collective enterprise. It provides a snap-
shot of what some would describe as the input to the workshop and not
its output which is presented elsewhere.2 Yet any collective assessment
is in some sense incomplete whether from a participant's direct observa-
tions or a reviewer's examination of its printed record.
Having shared in the workshop from which these articles are
drawn, contributed to the discussion of a proposed research agenda, and
reviewed its product, my task is to briefly review the contributions of the
individual articles to theory and research on victimization by crime.
Any reader will discern that these articles not only advance our thinking
and knowledge of the causes and consequences of victimization by
crime, but also they disclose the creative process in both theory and
method. Each of the articles contribute to our knowledge about victimi-
zation by crime. This introduction focuses on the gaps remaining be-
tween theory and research, with the hope that our readers will think
about these knowledge gaps and of how to close them.
WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?
Most of the theory and much of the research on crime victimization
I Saturn's Myserier Confound Theorists, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, § C, at 8, col. 2.
2 The workshop resulted in two products, one an edited transcript of the discussion of
papers prepared for the workshop, Victimology Research Agenda Development: Volume
II-Workshop Proceedings (J. Dahmann & J. Sasfy eds. MITRE Corp., MTS-80W00221,
1980), and the other a compilation of research topics resulting from the discussion, J. Sasfy &
J. Dahmann, Victimology Research Agenda Development: Volume III: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations (MTS-80W221, Aug. 1980).
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is person-centered. Yet, organizations also are victims. This selective
inattention to organizations as victims is evident in a number of ways.
For much of their history, statistics on crime events have lumped
person and organizational victims together in the calculation of crime
rates. In calculating the robbery rate, Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) in this country still includes robberies of establishments and
households with those of persons. Moreover, the base for crime rates
ordinarily is a population of persons calculated seemingly on the as-
sumption that only persons are at risk for these crime events. The UCR
robbery rate is calculated for the entire U.S. population. Even when
UCR separates nonresidential from residential burglaries in the United
States, the rates are calculated for a population of persons rather than
for separate populations of persons, households, and of all other organi-
zations. The National Crime Survey (NCS), on the other hand, treats
households rather than persons as the base population for the victimiza-
tion rates for burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny from a house-
hold when these crimes are reported by members of households. For a
time, NCS calculated commercial establishment rates, using an estimate
of their number as a base for that rate. These statistical bases, however,
are recent exceptions to conventional practice.
Another manifestation of the person-centered view of victimization
is the way that the NCS reports victimizations. The basic continuing
NCS is a study of a household and its members that limits the victimiza-
tion concept to the experiences persons have as a household or as victims
of personal crimes-rape, robbery, assault, and larceny from the person,
with and without contact. The person role, however, is central to the
NCS victimization concept so that whenever persons are victimized in
an organizational role, they are not treated as victims of crime. Thus, if
robbed in a commercial establishment, a patron is treated as a crime
victim. Yet, if the cashier in that same establishment is robbed, the
commercial establishment and not the cashier is regarded as victim.
Thus to be harmed in some way by a crime event does not necessarily
qualify either person or organization as a victim in the current NCS.
For persons to be treated as victims, they must act as private persons
and not in their organizational role. Moreover, current victimization
theory and measurement does not permit treating as victims both the
person (the cashier) and the organization (the commercial establish-
ment), even though the consequences from harm in this event may be
far greater for the cashier than the employer.
Although there are sound arguments that account for the NCS fo-
cusing solely upon the household and its members, the arguments do not
rest on theoretical presumptions about victims, but rather upon techni-
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cal measurement arguments or on grounds of public policy.3 Indeed, so
little attention is paid to the victimization of organizations that we lack
systematic information on organization victimization rates. Even crude
comparisons, however, of the victimization rates of organizations as
compared with those for persons disclose that for crimes where both
persons and organizations are at risk the rate for organizations is far
greater than that for persons. The robbery rate reported in the NCS for
all persons twelve years of age and over in 1976, for example, was 6.5 per
thousand whereas the actual rate was more than six times that at 38.5
per thousand commercial organizations.4 Were one to measure all com-
mercial robberies as person robberies with each commercial robbery
equaling one person victimization, the robbery rate in 1976 would have
been only 8.1 per thousand persons, still only roughly one-fifth that of
commercial organizations. 5 Moreover, in comparing differences in vic-
timization rates of household and commercial organizations, the rate for
commercial organizations is substantially higher. The 1976 burglary
rate reported by NCS for households was 88.9 per thousand households,
but was actually 217.3 per thousand commercial establishments.
6
Given the dependence of theory development upon empirical ob-
servations as well as its interdependence with testing theory, a state of
benign neglect of organizational victimization exists because we lack
empirical intelligence. Yet, that is perhaps only partly true. An attempt
at developing an intelligence system to report on organizations as vic-
tims would encounter a number of problems such as the disadvantages
of interview surveys in acquiring information on organizational victim-
izations. The person-centered respondent notions of the typical survey,
moreover, are inadequate to collect information about organizations,
particularly when the size and scope of the organization lies beyond the
experience of any of its members reporting from "memory."
Aside from problems of how best to collect information about each
crime type from the organization victim, serious problems exist in devel-
oping bases for calculating rates of organizational victimization. At
present, we lack a demography of organizations comparable to that of
persons, families, and households. Similarly, there is no sampling frame
3 The Panel for the Evaluation of Crime Surveys of the National Research Council rec-
ommended discontinuation of the "Commercial Survey" until there was agreement on its
objectives and that exploratory technical studies be conducted with respect to defining or
meeting those objectives in the interim. See PANEL FOR THE EVALUATION OF CRIME
SURVEYS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SURVEYING CRIME 59-61 (1976).
4 See LEAA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
1976 23 (1979) (Table 2).
5 These calculations are based on the size of the population and number of victimizations
reported in id. at 22 (Table 1).
6 See id. at 23 (Table 2).
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for organizations, nor is there any simple way to construct an area
probability sample to select them, given their stratification, spatial loca-
tion, and distribution. For these reasons, rates based on estimates of the
relative size and composition of an organization population are subject
to considerable error.
We collect and report, then, relatively few crime statistics for orga-
nizational victims and thus devote relatively little attention to modeling
the causes and consequences of, and responses to, organizational victimi-
zation. The models and measures of victims and victimization
presented in the articles in this symposium represent significant contri-
butions to our understanding of the causes and consequences of individ-
ual victimization and societal reaction to victims and their plight. Still,
by focusing almost exclusively on individuals and, to a lesser extent
households, these measures fail to capitalize on how our understanding
of victimization can be enhanced by treating organizations and collec-
tivities as victims. To enhance our understanding of the causes and con-
sequences of and societal response to victimization, a few illustrations
suggesting the inclusion of organizations are offered.
Were organizations treated as victims, the central concepts of life-
styles and routine activity patterns in Gottfredson's article or that of
precautionary behavior in Skogan's could be reconceptualized to in-
clude organizations. Indeed, in the broadest sense, routine activity pat-
terns are communal as well as individual or organizational in the
restricted sense of formally constituted organizations. The fate of indi-
viduals and their organizations as victims is tied to their collective fate.
How one watches over the life and property of others or the methods
organizations use to expose and protect their members at school, at
work, and at play are far from inconsequential in understanding the
etiology and consequences of and responses to victimization.
There is, moreover, a tendency to examine individual precaution-
ary behavior by emphasizing the irrational rather than the rational na-
ture of responses to crime and its victims and to address victim
precautionary behavior rather than behavior of those who are not vic-
timized within a given period. In deciding how to cope with the conse-
quences of crime, the managers of organizations or households, as
Skogan emphasizes, may manage their fate both by risk avoidance and
risk management techniques. These techniques range from decisions to
move to those of how to create defensible space. Organizational deci-
sions and behavior perhaps may depend more upon rational calcula-
tions and choice and less on fear of victimization or of crime than is the
case for individual choice and behavior. Moreover, we should augment
our understanding of the effects of precautionary behavior if we focus
equally on those rarely victimized as upon those who are often victim-
[Vol. 72
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ized. The methods organizations use to avoid and manage their victimi-
zation risk by crime may be illuminated as much by looking at those
who are "successful" in doing so well as by examining those who are not.
The shift in focus in Block's article to victim-offender interactions,
particularly in violent crimes, and to victim-environment relations pro-
vides a framework that can be generalized beyond violent crimes and
individual victims. Block emphasizes that preventing victimization and
exploring the victim reactions to their experience depend upon under-
standing the microenvironment of interactions between victims and of-
fenders in specific victimization events and the macroenvironment
within which the events occur. The article makes plain the basic ways
that organizations ordinarily enter into explanations of victimization-
as a structural context affecting one's risk of victimization and one's cop-
ing strategies. Block ignores the possibility that the rates of victimiza-
tion may be higher for organizations than for persons and that
organizations may experience a great deal of violence from crime, rob-
bery, and vandalism. Indeed, in limiting violence to crimes against per-
sons, the measurement ignores the more serious damage done to many
communities, to households, and other organizations in the community
through vandalism and arson. Organizations then, like individuals,
must cope with violence directed against "them." Indeed, the life of an
organization can be destroyed by arson and whole communities may
expire by vandalism and arson. Our task is to examine the application
of what Block deftly describes as "dynamics in violent crime" to formal
organizations and to communities. One assumes that the interactions
between victims and offenders leading to and during events differ in
substantial ways when violence is directed towards property rather than
persons. Vandalism, for example, may frequently rest in interactions
prior to, rather than during events.
The person-centered bias in victimization is perhaps most pro-
nounced in research on multiple victimization. Although one would ex-
pect much higher rates of multiple victimization for organizations than
for persons within any given period, the problematics of multiple victim-
ization and their explanation has fallen almost exclusively on the multi-
ple victimization of persons. Sparks' review of theories relevant to the
explanation of multiple victimization could well be considered as appli-
cable to both the multiple victimization of persons and their organiza-
tions. Victim precipitation may be more characteristic of multiple
victimization for some kinds of organizational crime than for persons.
Finally, we would note that the voluminous literature on measuring
victimization by crimes concerns how one secures information from in-
dividuals rather than upon how one obtains organization information.
The victim survey which has become the principal source of intelligence
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on crime victims is investigated primarily to understand how victims
recall their experiences or those of others rather than how best to collect
the experiences and behavior of organizations.
There are strategic reasons why the modeling and measuring of vic-
timization by crime has become person-centered, but our modeling and
measuring of the causes and consequences of victimization by crime will
be enhanced if we treat organizations as well as persons as crime victims.
THEORIES OF VICTIMIZATION BY CRIME
Victimizers act to produce victim states in victimizing events. This
structured duality in the noun victimization-referring both to the act
and the state of being victimized-is ignored by criminologists whose
theories identify victimization with classes of people labelled victims and
who are treated as distinct from other classes of people labelled victimiz-
ers or violators. That distinction distorts the reality of victimization as
events where one or more persons by their victimizing (victimization of)
others are labelled victimizers solely on the basis of their behavior in
that particular event and others who are in the state of being victimized
(victimization) who are labelled victims solely on the basis of conse-
quences for them in that event. The particular states in victimization
events often are treated as continuing beyond those events. Even with
persons as multiple victims or violators, their classification derives from
looking only at one of the two possible statuses in victimization events.
That the status presumption in events creates distinct classes or sub-
populations of victims and victimizers is highly questionable is demon-
strated by Simon's work reported in this symposium, using the follow-up
survey information from Delinquency in a Birth Cohort.7 Not only does
considerable overlap exist between populations of victims and offenders
as demonstrated by the substantial proportion of violators having also
been victims, but considerable evidence exists that the experience of be-
ing victimized increases the propensity for offending and that popula-
tions of victims and offenders have homogeneous characteristics.
Gottfredson draws our attention to a related fact, that often characteris-
tics closely associated with victimization are also associated with offend-
ing.
These findings demonstrate not only the importance of theories
about victimization focusing upon the behavior of all parties to crime
events rather than resorting to separate theories about victimization and
offending or about victims and offenders, but the findings also question




which kind of explanatory theories will explain both victimization and
offending.
Clearly, any theory that assumes no overlap exists between popula-
tions of victims and offenders or that they are distinct types of persons
distorts the empirical research. Thus, theories about victim and of-
fender personalities, dispositions, motives, and behavior must be consis-
tent with the empirical finding that quite commonly, at different times
and places as well as at the same time and place, the same person is
victim and offender. This observation applies to organizations as well.
Indeed, given the substantial population overlap, a reasonable con-
clusion is that social, situational, and environmental theories of causes
and consequences of victimization events will be more consistent with
empirical findings on victims and victimizers. Theories that divorce
properties of "victimizer" and "victim" from behaving units and treat
these units as behavioral elements of events in environments will be
most consistent in explaining what has up to now been treated as an
etiology of offending distinct from an etiology of victimization.
The articles in this symposium disclose how substantially the devel-
opment of our theories relies upon prior empirical investigation and not
upon speculation. This reliance is particularly evident with respect to
the substance of explanation as contrasted with properties that explain.
The conceptualization of victimization and of crime in the literature
and in the papers in this volume depend rather substantially upon our
knowledge about selected kinds of victimization and, for victimization
by crime, about selected kinds of crime.
Consider first how our conceptualization of victimization is molded
by it in terms of limited kinds of victimization or, simply, of crime. The
conception of victimization in terms of harm depends rather substan-
tially upon a model which accepts crime as serious and harmful. Yet, as
Biderman illustrates, most of what we treat and measure currently as
serious crime (except for homicides) does not have very serious conse-
quences. Moreover, those matters treated as trivial crimes may have far
more serious consequences, if not for individuals, then for the collectivi-
ties of which they are a part. Losses from vandalism or arson, as previ-
ously observed, are far more consequential to communities than are the
losses from all individual and household larceny. Indeed, one might
speculate that the cycle of deterioration in many urban neighborhoods
and communities begins not with burglary and crime on the streets, but
with vandalism, the cumulative effects of which result in arson. Or, the
existence of neighborhood businesses trading in vice may determine the
fate of those communities more than increasing the risk to inhabitants of




Quite clearly we bias the development of our theories in important
ways when we limit the conceptualization to crime and of victimization
by crime to traditionally serious crimes against persons and property.
We compound this bias when we make our theory development unduly
dependent on what we have learned by empirical investigation of vic-
timization from those serious crimes.
This becomes in part then, as Biderman observes, a matter of how
one conceptualizes events and their consequences. His article boldly
challenges our conventional theoretical notions about crimes as point-in-
time events and about the harmful consequences being immediate
rather than continuous or long term. These conceptualizations, as he
points out, stem both from our normative orientations toward these con-
cepts and from our methods of operationalizing and measuring them in
our surveys. That these matters can be approached without normative
considerations is clear from a seminal work by Lowrance on the matter
of acceptable risk in which he reminds us that "two very different activi-
ties are required for determining how safe things are: measuring risk, an
objective but probabilistic pursuit; and judging the acceptability of that risk
(judging safety), a matter of personal and social value judgement."8
Our theories about victimization by crime then can be enhanced if
we consider the harms and the risk that individuals and organizations
experience from many sources of harm, only one of which is crime. In-
deed, many kinds of objective harms can be treated as both criminal
and noncriminal matters under the law. We know very little about how
these matters should be treated in our harms theory since victim itself is
a normative concept.
Similarly, we need to expand not only the population of crime vic-
tims to include organizations and collectivities but also to expand the
kinds of crime by which these populations experience victimization.
Crimes vary considerably in scope of harm and consequences. Many
white collar crimes, such as fraud, environmental poisoning, and occu-
pational safety violations, victimize many people from a single or con-
tinuing pattern of violation. We need to test the capacity of our models
to explain victimization from a diversity of crimes, not simply from
those now treated normatively as the most serious individual and prop-
erty crimes.
Among the more highly developed models in criminology are those
of societal reaction to offending. Rather surprisingly such models have
not been applied to victimization and to crime events. Exploration of
the power of societal reaction theory in explaining responses to victimi-
8 W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF
SAFETY 8 (1976) (emphasis in original).
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zation and to crime events should permit us to better assess both the
limits of societal reaction theory from criminology and its power to ex-
plain offending.
A LAST CONSIDERATION
The participants in the workshop whose papers are presented in
this symposium all, more or less, have used the survey method to collect
information about victimization by crime and to test their models about
the causes and consequences or societal reactions to victimization by
crime. Yet many of the articles cast serious doubts upon the capacity of
surveys to measure that which is modeled or to test models by its meas-
ures. The articles by Sparks, Schneider, and Biderman develop a sub-
stantial agenda of methodological as well as substantive issues of grave
and great importance in surveying crimes and their victims.
The resolution of matters of measuring and testing models depends
not simply upon whether we can develop alternative surveys to increase
the scope and precision of our measures, but also upon the development
and testing of substantive theory related to our measures. As Skogan
and Biderman both emphasize, our measures rest substantially on recov-
ering information after events occur. The recovery of that information
rests in turn upon theories about how information can be recovered
from systems that "store" and "retrieve" it. Paradoxically, however, any
method of social measurement derives from more general theories or
laws about human behavior, but the laws, in turn, require methods for
the derivation. Hence we must also determine how human behavior
affects the methods used in measuring victimization by crime as well as
their use in that context. At the same time, however, we can further
develop and test our theories about human behavior relevant to our
methods through our empirical inquiry into victimization by crime.
The social reconstruction of reality, for example, is germane to the con-
ceptualization and measurement of the consequences of victimization by
crime. Concurrently, the explanatory power of that theory can be aug-
mented by examining how victims' experiences and their consequences
are constructed and reconstructed over time.
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